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Abstract
We consider trading against a hedge fund or large trader that must liquidate a large position
in a risky asset if the market price of the asset crosses a certain threshold. Liquidation occurs
in a disorderly manner and negatively impacts the market price of the asset. We consider the
perspective of small investors whose trades do not induce market impact and who possess different
levels of information about the liquidation trigger mechanism and the market impact. We classify
these market participants into three types: fully informed, partially informed and uninformed
investors. We consider the portfolio optimization problems and compare the optimal trading and
wealth processes for the three classes of investors theoretically and by numerical illustrations.
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1 Introduction
There is a large literature on insider trading, asymmetric information, and market manipulation trading
strategies including seminal works by Kyle [21], Back [7], Jarrow [15, 16], and Allen and Gale [2]. These
works generally assume that an insider is attempting to influence a price by, or profit from, the release
of, potentially false, information known to the insider. These studies also generally break market
participants into noise traders, standard informational traders, and informed traders. The existence
of arbitrage strategies, price equilibrium, or specific market manipulation strategies are the primary
concerns of these early works. Other papers dealing with insider information which quantify the value
of insider information through the maximization of agents wealth or utility include Elliott et al. [11],
Elliott and Jeanblanc [10], Amendinger et al. [4], and Amendinger et al. [5].
More recently liquidity modeling has become an intense area of study. Market micro-structure and
limit order books present one approach to modelling liquidity based on trading mechanisms. Models
that specify the price impact of trades as exogenously determined and depending on the size of a
transactions constitute another strand of the literature. Both approaches treat problems associated
with the fact that trading large positions impacts market prices. A good overview of liquidity models
can be found in Gökay et al. [14]. The modeling of market micro-structure and the optimal liquidation
of large positions has also been studied extensively and an overview of these topics can be found in
Abergel et al. [1]. To the best of our knowledge, among works dealing with asymmetric information,
only few papers concern the market impact of liquidation risk. In particular, Ankirchner et al. [6]
studies optimal liquidation problems of an insider.
In contrast to the existing literature we are concerned with disorderly, rather than optimal, liquida-
tion and the point of view of market participants other than the large trader or hedge fund liquidating
the position. In particular, we are interested in the following question: is it possible for a market
participant to profit from the knowledge that another market participant, with large positions in a
stock or derivative, will be forced to liquidate some or all of its position if the price crosses a cer-
tain threshold? There is ample evidence from financial markets concerning the importance of liquidity
risks. For example, consider a hedge fund with a large position in natural gas futures contracts, such as
Amaranth Advisors LLC in 2006, and macro-economic or weather events contribute to an unexpected
adverse change in the price. In this case the fund may be forced to unwind its positions in a disorderly
fashion, which would have a further market impact on the price. Other examples include the case of
Long Term Capital Management L.P. (LTCM) in 1998 and numerous firms during the financial crisis
of 2007-2008.
We assume that liquidation occurs immediately when the market price hits the liquidation trigger
level and has a temporary impact on the asset price, whereby the market price is depressed away
from the fundamental value, and gradually dissipates. We model the temporary market impact by a
function with parameters that control the impact speed and magnitude. Other market participants
may have different levels of information about the liquidation trigger mechanism and the liquidation
impact. We aim to find the optimal trading strategy that maximizes an investor’s terminal utility
of wealth under different types of information that are accessible to particular market participants.
In the standard information case an uninformed market participant is not aware of the liquidation
trigger mechanism. They believe and act, erroneously when liquidation occurs, as if the market price
is equal to the fundamental asset price. In the partial information case an insider or informed market
participant knows the level at which the hedge fund will be forced to liquidate the position but does
not have information about the liquidation volume which determines the price impact. In the full
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information case the insider has complete information about the liquidation threshold and the price
impact. Certain market participants may have access to this type of information owing to their position,
counter-party status, technology, or knowledge of the market. The fully informed investor’s perfect
information represents one extreme which may be unobtainable in practice. However, we shall show
numerically in the power-utility case that the optimal strategy for the partially informed investor is
quite close to that of the fully informed investor.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the framework of our model.
Section 3 solves the portfolio optimization problem for a fully informed investor and gives the explicit
expression of the optimal expected utility in case of log utility. Sections 4 and 5 explore the optimiza-
tion problems for uninformed and partially informed investors, respectively. Section 6 presents some
numerical results. Section 7 concludes and an appendix contains technical results and proofs.
2 The Market Model
2.1 Asset price and liquidation impact
Fix a probability space (Ω,A,P) equipped with a reference filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 satisfying the usual
conditions, with (Wt, t ≥ 0) an (F,P)-Brownian motion. Let T > 0 be a finite horizon time. In our
model, we assume that market participants may invest in a riskless asset and a risky asset. Without
loss of generality we suppose that the interest rate of the riskless asset is zero. The fundamental value
of the risky asset is modelled by a Black-Scholes diffusion:
dSt = St(µdt+ σdWt), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.1)
where µ and σ are supposed to be constants, and σ > 0.
We consider a hedge fund which holds a large long position in the risky asset over the investment
horizon [0, T ]. In normal circumstances, this position could be held until time T . However, according
to risk management policies, exchange rules, or regulatory requirements, the long position must be
liquidated in certain circumstances. In this paper, we assume that the liquidation will be triggered
when the market price of the risky asset passes below a pre-determined level. Before liquidation, the
market price, denoted by SM , is equal to the fundamental value S. So the liquidation time τ is defined
as the first passage time of a fixed constant threshold αS0 where α ∈ (0, 1), by the market price process
SM , i.e.,
τ := inf{t ≥ 0, SMt ≤ αS0} = inf{t ≥ 0, St ≤ αS0} (2.2)
with the convention inf ∅ =∞. We note that τ is an F-stopping time. In the simplest case the scenario
described corresponds to a margin call that cannot be covered resulting in the liquidation, in full or in
part, of the position.
The market price of the risky asset will be influenced by liquidation. Since the number of shares
of the risky asset to be sold is very large in comparison to the average volume traded in a short time
period, immediate liquidation would have a temporary impact on the market price which would be
driven down away from the fundamental price after liquidation. We denote by SIt (u) the market price
of the risky asset at time t after the liquidation time τ = u. Suppose that it is given as
SIt (u) = g(t− u; Θ,K)St, u ≤ t ≤ T. (2.3)
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where g is an impact function and Θ and K are parameters which will be made precise later. We note
that the mathematical characterization of market impact is a very complicated problem, and we refer
the interested reader to Kissell and Glantz [20] for details. In this paper, inspired by Li et al. [22], we
characterize the temporary influence of liquidation on market by the impact function g of the form
g(t; Θ,K) = 1− Kt
Θ
e1−
t
Θ (2.4)
where Θ and K are positive parameters with Θ controlling the speed of the market impact and K
representing the magnitude of the market impact. In particular, we assume that Θ is a positive random
variable and K is a random variable valued in [0, 1], both of which are independent of F and with joint
probability density function ϕ(·, ·), i.e. P(Θ ∈ dθ,K ∈ dk) = ϕ(θ, k)dθdk.
Figure 1 illustrates the impact function (2.4) with K = 0.1 and two different realized values of
Θ. Clearly the shape of the impact function with Θ = 0.05 is steeper than with Θ = 0.1. We note
that for each fixed scenario ω, the function g attains its minimum value 1−K(ω) at t = Θ(ω). Also,
we observe that the function g first declines from 1 and then rises back and converges to 1, which
characterizes the market impact of liquidation with time evolution. For realized values K = 0.1 and
Θ = 0.1 it would take 0.1 year, which is approximately 25 trading days, for the asset price to reach
the minimum value (1 −K) ∗ S0 after liquidation occurs. The market impact in the first trading day
after liquidation is 1 − g( 1250 ; 0.1, 0.1) ≈ 1%. Therefore, the parameter Θ needs to be small to more
accurately reflect the impact of disorderly liquidation. In Section 6 we present some numerical results
which use a rather large Θ that guarantees better accuracy of the numerical results, but these could
be improved by applying other numerical techniques for smaller values of Θ.
Time(year)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Im
pa
ct
 fu
nc
tio
n
0.9
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
θ  = 0.05, K = 0.05
θ  = 0.1, K = 0.1
Figure 1: Impact function with 2 parameters
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Figure 2: Impact function with 4 parameters
Remark 2.1. It is natural to consider a jump effect for the price impact of liquidation. In our model,
by (2.3), the price before and just after liquidation satisfies the relation SIt (t) = St. However, we can
approximate downward jumps of asset prices after liquidation by choosing small values of Θ in the
smooth function g. Further, our model allows us to consider the situation that liquidation by the large
trader may have no long-term informational content. The temporary impact on the market price decays
as liquidity providers return to the market and other market participants realize that there may be no
information about the fundamental value of the risky asset conveyed by the hedge fund’s disorderly
liquidation.
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A possible extension is to consider a modified impact function with additional parameters and flex-
ibility. For example, let
g(t; Θ1,Θ2,K1,K2) =

1−
(K1+K2)t
Θ1
e
1− t
Θ1 0 ≤ t < Θ1,
1−K1 − K2(t+Θ2−Θ1)Θ2 e
1− t+Θ2−Θ1
Θ2 Θ1 ≤ t.
(2.5)
The impact function given by (2.5) incorporates both permanent and temporary market impacts with
K1 and K2 controlling the magnitude of permanent and temporary market impacts respectively. The
parameters Θ1 and Θ2 determine both the deviation and reversal speed (see Figure 2). Moreover, at
long-term time scale, the impact function can come back to a different level other than 1. For simplicity,
we will use the impact function given by (2.4) in this paper and suppose the parameters Θ and K to be
random variables.
Considering the market price of the asset to be equal to the fundamental value before the liquidation
time τ and to be the impacted asset price after liquidation, we have that the market price is given as
SMt = 1{0≤t<τ∧T}St + 1{τ∧T≤t≤T}S
I
t (τ)
where St and S
I
t (τ) are given by (2.1) and (2.3) respectively. Moreover, for any u ≥ 0, the dynamics
of the process SIt (u) satisfies the SDE
dSIt (u) = S
I
t (u)
(
µIt (u,Θ,K)dt + σdWt
)
, u ≤ t ≤ T (2.6)
where
µIt (u,Θ,K) =
g′(t− u; Θ,K)
g(t− u; Θ,K) + µ. (2.7)
Remark 2.2. The process (SIt (u), t ≥ u) is adapted with respect to the filtration F ∨ σ(Θ,K) which
is the initial enlargement of F by the random variables (Θ,K). As we suppose σ(Θ,K) is independent
of F∞, the (F,P)-Brownian motion W is also a (F∨ σ(Θ,K),P)-Brownian motion (see e.g. Jeanblanc
et al. [17, Section 5.9].)
Thus the market price process of the risky asset, denoted as SM = (SMt , t ≥ 0), satisfies the SDE
dSMt = S
M
t
(
µMt (Θ,K)dt+ σdWt
)
(2.8)
where
µMt (Θ,K) = 1{0≤t<τ∧T}µ+ 1{τ∧T≤t≤T}µ
I
t (τ,Θ,K). (2.9)
We note that the market price admits a regime change at the liquidation time τ , in particular on the
drift term. We give an illustrative example as below.
Example 2.3. Suppose that the fundamental value process (2.1) is given by the Black-Scholes model
with parameters SM0 = 80, µ = 0.07, σ = 0.2, α = 0.9,Θ = 0.1,K = 0.1. Figure 3 shows that
liquidation triggers a downward jump of the drift term. Afterward the drift term first rises quickly and
then declines gradually back to the original drift term. Correspondingly, Figure 4 shows the sample
market price processes of the asset subject to liquidation impact compared with the fundamental value
process.
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Figure 3: Drift µ before and after liquidation
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Figure 4: Corresponding asset price SM
2.2 The optimal investment problem
Our objective is to consider the optimal investment problem from the perspective of investors who trade
in the market for the risky asset subject to price impact from disorderly liquidation of the hedge fund’s
position. For simplicity we assume these agents may trade in the market for the risky asset without
transaction costs. We consider fully informed investors, partially informed investors and uninformed
investors. We suppose that all investors have access to the market price of the risky asset SM but their
knowledge of the liquidation and price impact are different. We further assume that all the investors
know the values of the parameters µ and σ.
Fully informed investors observe the market price and are assumed to have complete knowledge of
the mechanism of liquidation and the price impact function. Hence they know, in mathematical terms,
the liquidation trigger level α, the impact function g, and the values of the random variables Θ and K
when liquidation occurs. Therefore, fully informed investors have complete knowledge of the dynamics
of the market price process, together with the information of the price impact.
Partially informed investors are also able to observe the market price and know the liquidation
trigger level α, therefore, the liquidation time τ is also observable for them. However, partially informed
investors do not have complete information about the price impact function. We suppose the partially
informed investors know the functional form of the price impact function g. However, we assume the
partially informed investors only know the distributions of Θ and K but not the realized value that is
necessary to have full knowledge of the price impact of liquidation.
Uninformed investors are not aware of the liquidation trigger mechanism. They erroneously believe
the market price process follows the Black-Scholes dynamics (2.1) without price impact. Considering
uninformed investors allows us to quantify the value of information about the liquidation barrier and
price impact, compared to a Merton-type investor.
We denote by FS = (FSt )t≥0 the natural filtration generated by the market price process SM . Since
the market price coincides with the fundamental value process S before liquidation, the liquidation
time τ , which is an F-stopping time, is also an FS-stopping time. We summarize the knowledge of the
various investors in the following assumption.
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Assumption 2.4. All investors observe the market price of the risky asset and know the values of the
parameters µ and σ. In addition certain market participants possess additional information:
(i) The observable information for fully informed investors is modeled by the filtration
G(2)t = FSt ∨ σ(Θ,K) = Ft ∨ σ(Θ,K),
they further know the liquidation barrier α, as well as the form of the impact function g.
(ii) The observable information for partially informed investors is modeled by the filtration
G(1)t = FSt ,
they further know the liquidation barrier α, the form of the impact function g, and the distribution
of (Θ,K).
(iii) To compare with the above two types of insiders, we consider uninformed investors whose
observable information is modeled by the filtration G(0)t = FSt . They have no information about
the liquidation mechanism. Further, they do not update their knowledge of the drift process after τ
and act as Merton-type investors, erroneously considering Black-Scholes dynamics with constant
µ over the entire period [0, T ].
Remark 2.5. The common information to three types investors are represented by the "public" filtra-
tion FS since the market price of the risky asset is observable to all investors. Assumption 2.4 implies
that partially informed investors know the the law of µMt (Θ,K). This is similar to the weak information
case of Baudoin [8].
The essential differences among these three types of investors lie in their knowledge on the drift
term µM (Θ,K) defined in (2.7). Fully informed investors are able to completely observe the drift
term. Partially informed investors partially observe the drift term, corresponding to the case of partial
observations considered by Karatzas and Zhao [19]. Partially informed investors may obtain an estimate
of the drift term which is adapted to their observation process using filtering theory. Uninformed
investors do not have any information about the liquidation mechanism and market impact which causes
them to erroneously specify the drift term as µ. That is, uninformed investors believe that the market
prices follow the Black-Scholes dynamics (2.1). If the uninformed investor treated the drift of (2.1)
as an unobservable process he could perhaps apply filtering theory to improve his investment decisions
even without knowing anything about the liquidation mechanism or market impact function. However,
in this paper we shall only consider the case of Assumption 2.4, that is of uninformed investors who
estimate the drift at the beginning of the period and do not update it, since from their own view point
no liquidation event happened during the period [0, T ]. The uninformed investors are mainly considered
as a benchmark for comparison with the Merton model.
We shall study the portfolio optimization problem for three types of investors in the remainder of
this paper under logarithmic and power utility.
3 Fully informed investors
Fully informed investors choose their trading strategy to adjust the portfolio of assets according to their
information accessibility. As discussed in Section 2 fully informed investors know the realized values of
7
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the random variables Θ and K. The investment strategy is characterized by a G(2)-predictable process
pi(2) which represents the proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset. The admissible strategy set
A(2) is a collection of pi(2) such that, for any (θ, k) ∈ (0,+∞)× (0, 1),∫ T
0
|pi(2)t µMt (θ, k)|dt+
∫ T
0
|pi(2)t σ|2dt <∞. (3.1)
The risk aversion of the investors is modeled by classic utility functions U defined on (0,∞) that are
strictly increasing, strictly concave, with continuous derivative U ′(x) on (0,∞), and satisfying
lim
x→0+
U ′(x) = +∞ lim
x→∞U
′(x) = 0.
We define the G(2)-martingale measure Q by the likelihood process
Lt :=
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
G(2)t
= exp
{
−
∫ t
0
µMv (Θ,K)
σ
dWv −
∫ t
0
(
µMv (Θ,K)
)2
2σ2
dv
}
. (3.2)
As mentioned in Remark 2.2, W is a (G(2),P)-Brownian motion. By Girsanov’s theorem, the process
WQ defined as
WQt = Wt +
∫ t
0
µMv (Θ,K)
σ
dv (3.3)
is an (G(2),Q)-Brownian motion and the dynamics of the asset price SM under Q may be written as
dSMt = S
M
t σdW
Q
t . (3.4)
By taking a strategy pi2 ∈ A(2), the wealth process with initial endowment X0 ∈ G(2)0 evolves as
dX
(2)
t = X
(2)
t pi
(2)
t (µ
M
t (Θ,K)dt+ σdWt), 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.5)
that is
X
(2)
t = X0 +
∫ T
0
pi(2)v σS
M
v dW
Q
v . (3.6)
The fully informed investor’s objective is to maximize her expected utility of terminal wealth
V
(2)
0 := sup
pi(2)∈A(2)
E
[
U
(
X
(2)
T
)]
(3.7)
or
V
(2)
0 (Θ,K) := ess sup
pi(2)(Θ,K)∈A(2)
E
[
U
(
X
(2)
T
)
|G(2)0
]
(3.8)
where G(2)0 = σ(Θ,K). The link between the optimization problems (3.7) and (3.8) is given by
Amendinger et al. [5]; if the supremum in (3.8) is attained by some strategy in A(2), then the ω-
wise optimum is also a solution to (3.7).
As (Θ,K) is independent1 of F, a martingale representation theorem holds for (G(2),Q)-local
martingale, thus we adopt the standard "martingale approach" (see Karatzas and Shreve [18]) to solve
the utility optimization problem (3.8). We may consider the following static optimization problem
sup
X
(2)
T
∈V
E
[
U
(
X
(2)
T
)
|G(2)0
]
(3.9)
1This assumption can be relaxed into a density Jacod hypothesis, using then the result of Amendinger [3, Proposition
4.6] for a martingale representation theorem.
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where V =
{
X
(2)
T
∣∣∣X(2)T = X0 + ∫ T0 pi(2)v σSMv dWQv , pi(2) ∈ A(2)}. The optimization problem (3.9) can
be solved by using the method of Lagrange multipliers (see Amendinger et al. [5, Proposition 4.5]).
The optimal terminal wealth Xˆ
(2)
T is given by
Xˆ
(2)
T = I(ΛLT ), (3.10)
where I = (U ′)−1 and the G(2)0 -measurable random variable Λ is determined by
EQ
[
I(ΛLT )| G(2)0
]
= X0. (3.11)
In order to find the optimal strategy pˆi(2) one should provide the dynamics of the optimal wealth
process
Xˆ
(2)
t = E
Q
[
Xˆ
(2)
T |G(2)t
]
. (3.12)
Since (X
(2)
t )t∈[0,T ] is a (G
(2),Q)-martingale, there exists a G(2)-adapted process J such that
Xˆ
(2)
t = E
Q[Xˆ
(2)
T
∣∣∣G(2)0 ] +
∫ t
0
JvdW
Q
v . (3.13)
Substituting (3.11) into (3.13) we have
Xˆ
(2)
t = X0 +
∫ t
0
JvdW
Q
v . (3.14)
Comparing (3.6) with (3.14), we obtain the optimal strategy
pˆi
(2)
t =
Jt
σXˆ
(2)
t
. (3.15)
Notice that the optimal strategy (pˆi
(2)
t )t∈[0,T ] involves the process J which is implicitly determined by
the martingale representation as in (3.13). To obtain an explicit expression for the optimal strategy,
we will consider power and logarithmic utilities in the following subsections.
3.1 Power utility
We first consider the power utility U(x) = x
p
p
, 0 < p < 1. Using the fact that I(x) = xp−1 and by
(3.10)-(3.11) we obtain the optimal terminal wealth
Xˆ
(2)
T =
X0
E
[
(LT )
p
p−1
] (LT ) 1p−1 (3.16)
where LT is given by (3.2). The following proposition gives then the optimal expected utility as well
as the optimal strategy:
9
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Proposition 3.1. For power utility U(x) = x
p
p
, 0 < p < 1, the optimal expected utility is
V
(2)
0 (Θ,K) =
(X0)
p
p
(
E
[
(LT )
p
p−1
])1−p
(3.17)
and the optimal strategy is given by
pˆi
(2)
t = 1{0≤t<τ∧T}pˆi
(2,b)
t + 1{τ∧T≤t≤T}pˆi
(2,a)
t , t ∈ [0, T ] (3.18)
where
pˆi
(2,b)
t =
µ
(1− p)σ2 +
ZHt
σHt
, t ∈ [[0, τ ∧ T [[, (3.19)
pˆi
(2,a)
t =
µIt (τ,Θ,K)
(1− p)σ2 , t ∈ [[τ ∧ T, T ]] (3.20)
with (H,ZH) satisfying the following linear BSDE
Ht = 1 +
∫ T
t
(
p
(
µMv (Θ,K)
)2
2(1− p)2σ2 Hv +
pµMv (Θ,K)
(1− p)σ Z
H
v
)
dv −
∫ T
t
ZHv dWv. (3.21)
Proof. Following Björk et al. [9] we find the explicit expression for the optimal strategy, by computing
the dynamics of the optimal wealth process. Applying the abstract Bayes’ formula to (3.12), we obtain
Xˆ
(2)
t =E
Q
[
Xˆ
(2)
T |G(2)t
]
=
1
Lt
E
[
Xˆ
(2)
T LT |G(2)t
]
. (3.22)
Substituting (3.2) and (3.16) into (3.22) we have
Xˆ
(2)
t =
X0
E[(LT )
p
p−1 ]Lt
E
[
(LT )
p
p−1 |G(2)t
]
=
X0
E[(LT )
p
p−1 ]Lt
E
[
exp
{∫ T
0
pµMv (Θ,K)
(1− p)σ dWv +
∫ T
0
p
(
µMv (Θ,K)
)2
2(1 − p)σ2 dv
}
|G(2)t
]
=
X0(Lt)
1
p−1
E[(LT )
p
p−1 ]
E
[
exp
{∫ T
t
pµMv (Θ,K)
(1− p)σ dWv +
∫ T
t
p
(
µMv (Θ,K)
)2
2(1− p)σ2 dv
}
|G(2)t
]
(3.23)
Defining
Ht := E[exp
{∫ T
t
pµMv (Θ,K)
(1− p)σ dWv +
∫ T
t
p(µMv (Θ,K))
2
2(1− p)σ2 dv
}
|G(2)t ] (3.24)
the optimal wealth process writes as
Xˆ
(2)
t =
X0
H0
(Lt)
1
p−1Ht. (3.25)
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HILLAIRET et al. Optimal trading under asymmetric information November 7, 2018
In order to find the dynamics of (Ht)t∈[0,T ], we first remark that (Mt := HtDt)t∈[0,T ] is a (G(2),P)-
martingale, where
Dt := exp
{∫ t
0
pµMv (Θ,K)
(1− p)σ dWv +
∫ t
0
p(µMv (Θ,K))
2
2(1− p)σ2 dv
}
. (3.26)
By the martingale representation theorem there exists a G(2)-adapted process ZM such that
Mt = M0 +
∫ t
0
MvZ
M
v dWv. (3.27)
From equation (3.26)
d(
1
Dt
) = (
1
Dt
)
{(
p2(µMt (Θ,K))
2
2(1 − p)2σ2 −
p(µMt (Θ,K))
2
2(1 − p)σ2
)
dt− pµ
M
t (Θ,K)
(1− p)σ dWt
}
(3.28)
which leads to the following dynamics for the process (Ht)t∈[0,T ]
dHt = Ht
{(
p2(µMt (Θ,K))
2
2(1 − p)2σ2 −
p(µMt (Θ,K))
2
2(1− p)σ2 −
pµMt (Θ,K)
(1− p)σ Z
M
t
)
dt+
(
ZMt −
pµMt (Θ,K)
(1− p)σ
)
dWt
}
.
Denoting ZHt := HtZ
M
t − pµ
M
t (Θ,K)
(1−p)σ and using the terminal condition HT = 1, (Ht)t∈[0,T ] satisfies the
following BSDE
Ht = 1 +
∫ T
t
(
p(µMv (Θ,K))
2
2(1− p)2σ2 Hv +
pµMv (Θ,K)
(1− p)σ Z
H
v
)
dv −
∫ T
t
ZHv dWv . (3.29)
Thus the dynamics of the optimal wealth process, using (3.25), are
dXˆ
(2)
t = Xˆ
(2)
t
((
µMt (Θ,K)
)2
(1− p)σ2 +
µMt (Θ,K)Z
H
t
σHt
)
dt+ Xˆ
(2)
t
(
µMt (Θ,K)
(1− p)σ +
ZHt
Ht
)
dWt. (3.30)
that leads to the optimal strategy (by comparing (3.30) with (3.5))
pˆi
(2)
t =
µMt (Θ,K)
(1− p)σ2 +
ZHt
σHt
. (3.31)
We decompose the time horizon [0, T ] into two random time intervals [[0, τ ∧ T [[ and [[τ ∧ T, T ]]. On
the random interval [[τ ∧ T, T ]], the fully informed investor observes the drift term µM thus the BSDE
(3.29) can be solved explicitly on [[τ ∧ T, T ]]:
Ht = exp
{∫ T
t
p(µIv(τ,Θ,K))
2
2(1− p)2σ2 dv
}
, (3.32)
ZHt = 0. (3.33)
Recalling (2.9) and using (3.32)-(3.33) we may decompose the optimal strategy in (3.31) into two parts:
pˆi
(2)
t = 1{0≤t<τ∧T}pˆi
(2,b)
t + 1{τ∧T≤t≤T}pˆi
(2,a)
t (3.18)
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where
pˆi
(2,b)
t =
µ
(1− p)σ2 +
ZHt
σHt
, t ∈ [[0, τ ∧ T [[, (3.19) (3.34)
pˆi
(2,a)
t =
µIt (τ,Θ,K)
(1− p)σ2 , t ∈ [[τ ∧ T, T ]]. (3.20) (3.35)
The optimal strategy after liquidation in (3.20) is essentially a Merton-type strategy. The part
before liquidation in (3.19) is the sum of a Merton strategy and an extra component2 which is deter-
mined by the solution of the BSDE (3.21). It is hard to obtain a closed-form solution for the BSDE
(3.21), however, we may solve the BSDE (3.21) numerically which will be discussed in Section 6.
We next consider the case of logarithmic utility for the fully informed investor.
3.2 Logarithmic utility
In this section we consider the logarithmic utility U(x) = ln(x). Using the fact that I(x) = 1
x
and by
(3.10)-(3.11) we obtain the optimal terminal wealth
Xˆ
(2)
T =
X0
LT
(3.36)
where LT is given by (3.2). The optimal expected utility is
V
(2)
0 (Θ,K) = ln(X0)− E [ln(LT )] .
Applying the abstract Bayes’ formula to (3.12) and using (3.36), we obtain
Xˆ
(2)
t =E
Q
[
Xˆ
(2)
T |G(2)t
]
=
1
Lt
E
[
Xˆ
(2)
T LT |G(2)t
]
=
X0
Lt
(3.37)
whose dynamics are given by
dXˆ
(2)
t =
(
µMt (Θ,K)
)2
2σ2
dt+
µMt (Θ,K)
σ
dWt. (3.38)
Comparing (3.38) with (3.5) we obtain the optimal strategy
pˆi
(2)
t =
µMt (Θ,K)
σ2
.
Recalling (2.9) we may decompose the optimal strategy into two parts
pˆi
(2)
t = 1{0≤t<τ∧T}pˆi
(2,b)
t + 1{τ∧T≤t≤T}pˆi
(2,a)
t (3.39)
2This extra term is called "hedging demand for parameter risk" by Björk [9].
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where
pˆi
(2,b)
t =
µ
σ2
, t ∈ [[0, τ ∧ T [[, (3.40)
pˆi
(2,a)
t =
µIt (τ,Θ,K)
σ2
, t ∈ [[τ ∧ T, T ]]. (3.41)
The optimal trading strategy for the fully informed investor is composed of two Merton strategies
before and after-liquidation. Accordingly we decompose the optimal wealth process Xˆ
(2)
t as
Xˆ
(2)
t = 1{0≤t<τ∧T}Xˆ
(2,b)
t + 1{τ∧T≤t≤T}Xˆ
(2,a)
t
where Xˆ(2,b) and Xˆ(2,a) satisfy the following SDEs
dXˆ
(2,b)
t = Xˆ
(2,b)
t pˆi
(2,b)
t (µtdt+ σdWt), t ∈ [[0, τ ∧ T [[, (3.42)
dXˆ
(2,a)
t = Xˆ
(2,a)
t pˆi
(2,a)
t
{
µIt (τ,Θ,K)dt+ σdWt
}
, t ∈ [[τ ∧ T, T ]]. (3.43)
Then we decompose the expected utility of terminal wealth into two parts depending on if liquidation
occurs before or after time T :
V
(2)
0 (Θ,K) = E[1{τ>T} ln(Xˆ
(2,b)
T )|G(2)0 ] + E[1{τ≤T} ln(Xˆ(2,a)T )|G(2)0 ]. (3.44)
The two conditional expectations in (3.44) are calculated in Lemma A.1 and A.2 respectively. Com-
bining those lemmas we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.2. The optimal log expected utility for fully informed investors is
V
(2)
0 (Θ,K) ={
N
(
− lnα
σ
+ (µ
σ
− 12σ)T√
T
)
− exp
(
2µ
σ2
− lnα
)
N
(
lnα
σ
+ (µ
σ
− 12σ)T√
T
)}
×
(
ln(X0) +
1
2
(µ− µ
2
σ2
)T
)
+
∫ 0
lnα
σ
∫ ∞
y
2µx(x− 2y)√
2piT 3
exp
{
(
µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)x− 1
2
(
µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)2T − 1
2T
(2y − x)2
}
dxdy
− lnα
σ
∫ T
0
1√
2pit3
exp
{
− 1
2t
(
lnα
σ
− (µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)t
)2}
h(2)(t,Θ,K)dt
where
h(2)(t; θ, k) := lnX0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
t− µ
2
2σ2
t+
∫ T
t
(
µIv(t, θ, k)
)2
2σ2
dv.
In the next section we consider the optimization problem for the partially informed investors.
4 Partially informed investors
The portfolio strategy for partially informed investors is supposed to be G(1)-adapted and denoted by
pi(1) = (pi
(1)
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T ). The wealth process evolves as
dX
(1)
t = X
(1)
t pi
(1)
t (µ
M
t (Θ,K)dt+ σdWt), 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.1)
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Similar to (3.1), the admissible strategy set A(1) is a collection of pi(1) such that, for any (θ, k) ∈
(0,+∞)× (0, 1), ∫ T
0
|pi(1)t µMt (θ, k)|dt+
∫ T
0
|pi(1)t σ|2dt <∞. (4.2)
The portfolio optimization problem for partially informed investors is
V
(1)
0 = sup
pi(1)∈A(1)
E
[
U
(
X
(1)
T
)]
. (4.3)
Note that the optimization problem (4.1)-(4.3) is the case of partial observations since the drift term
in (4.1) is not G(1)-adapted.
Following Karatzas and Zhao [19] we first reduce the optimization problem of partial observation
to the case of complete observation. Recall that the probability measure Q is defined as
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
G(2)
T
= LT . (4.4)
with the density process
Lt = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
µMv (Θ,K)
σ
dWv −
∫ t
0
(
µMv (Θ,K)
)2
2σ2
dv
}
(4.5)
being a (G(2),P)-martingale.
We next define the filtered estimate of the drift µMt (Θ,K), based on the observation of the market
price, by
µ¯Mt = E
[
µMt (Θ,K)|G(1)t
]
. (4.6)
We define the innovations process W˜ by
dW˜t = dWt +
µMt (Θ,K)− µ¯Mt
σ
dt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.7)
By Björk et al. [9, Lemma 4.1] we know W˜ is a standard (G(1),P)-Brownian motion. Then we may
rewrite (2.8) as
dSMt = S
M
t
(
µ¯Mt dt+ σdW˜t
)
. (4.8)
and the wealth process X(1) as
dX
(1)
t = X
(1)
t pi
(1)
t (µ¯
M
t dt+ σdW˜t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T (4.9)
with initial wealth x0 ∈]0,+∞[. Now the dynamics of the wealth process X(1) is within the framework
of a full observation model since µ¯M is G(1)-adapted.
Similar to the case of fully informed investors, the optimization problem (4.3) can be solved by the
martingale approach.
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Proposition 4.1. (i)The optimal terminal wealth of a partially informed investors, with utility function
U and I = (U ′)−1 is given by
Xˆ
(1)
T = I(λL¯T ).
The Lagrange multiplier λ is determined by the budget constraint
E
[
I(λL¯T )L¯T
]
= x0 (4.10)
and L¯T is the density of the risk neutral probability measure for the filtration G
(1)
L¯t = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
µ¯Mv
σ
dW˜v −
∫ t
0
(
µ¯Mv
)2
2σ2
dv
}
(4.11)
with µ¯Mt = E
[
µMt (Θ,K)|G(1)t
]
(ii) The filtered drift estimate µ¯M can be computed as
µ¯Mt =


µ, t ∈ [[0, τ ∧ T [[
∫∞
0
∫ 1
0
{
µMt (θ,k) exp
{∫ t
0
µMv (θ,k)
σ
dW
Q
v −
∫ t
0
(µMv (θ,k))
2
2σ2
dv
}}
ϕ(θ,k)dθdk
∫∞
0
∫ 1
0
{
exp
{∫ t
0
µMv (θ,k)
σ
dW
Q
v −
∫ t
0
(µMv (θ,k))
2
2σ2
dv
}}
ϕ(θ,k)dθdk
, t ∈ [[τ ∧ T, T ]]. (4.12)
Proof. (i) We define the process L¯t = E
Q[Lt|G(1)t ]. By rewriting Lt in (4.5) as
Lt = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
µMv (Θ,K)
σ
dWQv +
∫ t
0
(
µMv (Θ,K)
)2
2σ2
dv
}
, (4.13)
we compute
L¯t = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
µ¯Mv
σ
dWQv +
∫ t
0
(
µ¯Mv
)2
2σ2
dv
}
(4.14)
Combining (4.18) and (4.7) we have
dWQt = dW˜t +
µ¯Mt
σ
dt. (4.15)
Substituting (4.15) into (4.14) we find
L¯t = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
µ¯Mv
σ
dW˜v −
∫ t
0
(
µ¯Mv
)2
2σ2
dv
}
. (4.16)
Since L¯t is a (G
(1),P)-martingale, we define the the risk neutral probability measure Q˜ by
dQ˜
dP
∣∣∣∣∣
G(1)t
= L¯t. (4.17)
15
HILLAIRET et al. Optimal trading under asymmetric information November 7, 2018
By the fact that W˜ is a (G(1),P)-Brownian motion and the Girsanov’s theorem, the processW Q˜ defined
as
W Q˜t = W˜t +
∫ t
0
µ¯Mv
σ
dv, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (4.18)
is a (G(1), Q˜)-Brownian motion.
Following the same procedure as in Section 3 we find the optimal terminal wealth Xˆ
(1)
T given by
Xˆ
(1)
T = I(λL¯T ), (4.19)
where I = (U ′)−1 and the Lagrange multiplier λ is determined by
E
[
I(λL¯T )L¯T
]
= x0. (4.20)
(ii) Recall that
1
Lt
=
dP
dQ
∣∣∣∣
G(2)t
= exp
{∫ t
0
µMv (Θ,K)
σ
dWQv −
∫ t
0
(
µMv (Θ,K)
)2
2σ2
dv
}
(4.21)
is (G(2),Q)-martingale. By the Kallianpur-Striebel formula, which is related to Bayes formula, we have
µ¯Mt =E
[
µMt (Θ,K)|G(1)t
]
=
EQ
[
µMt (Θ,K)LT |G(1)t
]
EQ[Lt|G(1)t ]
=
EQ
[
EQ
[
µMt (Θ,K)LT |G(2)t
] ∣∣∣G(1)t ]
EQ[Lt|G(1)t ]
=
EQ
[
µMt (Θ,K)Lt|G(1)t
]
EQ[Lt|G(1)t ]
=
EQ
[
µMt (Θ,K) exp
{∫ t
0
µMv (Θ,K)
σ
dWQv −
∫ t
0
(µMv (Θ,K))
2
2σ2 dv
}
|G(1)t
]
EQ[exp
{∫ t
0
µMv (Θ,K)
σ
dWQv −
∫ t
0
(µMv (Θ,K))
2
2σ2
dv
}
|G(1)t ]
. (4.22)
Since the measure Q coincides with P on G(2)0 = σ(Θ,K), the distribution of (Θ,K) under Q is identical
to the one under P. Recall that the Brownian motion WQ is independent of σ(Θ,K) we have
µ¯Mt =
∫∞
0
∫ 1
0
{
µMt (θ, k) exp
{∫ t
0
µMv (θ,k)
σ
dWQv −
∫ t
0
(µMv (θ,k))
2
2σ2 dv
}}
ϕ(θ, k)dθdk
∫∞
0
∫ 1
0
{
exp
{∫ t
0
µMv (θ,k)
σ
dWQv −
∫ t
0
(µMv (θ,k))
2
2σ2 dv
}}
ϕ(θ, k)dθdk
. (4.23)
For t < τ ∧ T we have µ¯Mt = µ due to the fact that µMt = µ.
Following Fujisaki et al. [12] there exits a martingale representation theorem with respect to the
(G(1), Q˜)-Brownian motion W Q˜. Similar to the case of fully informed investors, the optimal strategy
pi(1) relies on the martingale representation theorem. For a general utility function, the optimal strategy
pi(1) does not have explicit expression. In the next subsections, we will consider power and logarithmic
utilities.
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4.1 Power utility
We first consider the power utility U(x) = x
p
p
, 0 < p < 1. The optimal terminal wealth at T is given
by
Xˆ
(1)
T =
x0
E
[(
L¯T
) p
p−1
] (L¯T ) 1p−1 (4.24)
where L¯T is given by equation (4.11). The optimal expected utility is
V
(1)
0 =
(x0)
p
p
(
E
[(
L¯T
) p
p−1
])1−p
. (4.25)
Similar to the case of fully informed investors, we may decompose the optimal strategy pˆi(1) into
two parts:
pˆi
(1)
t = 1{0≤t<τ∧T}pˆi
(1,b)
t + 1{τ∧T≤t≤T}pˆi
(1,a)
t . (4.26)
Following a similar procedure as in Section 3.1 we obtain
pˆi
(1,b)
t =
µ
(1− p)σ2 +
ZH¯t
σH¯t
, t ∈ [[0, τ ∧ T [[, (4.27)
pˆi
(1,a)
t =
µ¯It
(1− p)σ2 , t ∈ [[τ ∧ T, T ]]. (4.28)
where (H¯, ZH¯) satisfies the linear BSDE
H¯t = 1 +
∫ T
t
(
p
(
µ¯Mv
)2
2(1− p)2σ2 H¯v +
pµ¯Mv
(1− p)σZ
H¯
v
)
dv −
∫ T
t
ZH¯v dW˜v. (4.29)
We will discuss the numerical solution of BSDE (4.29) in Section 6.
4.2 Log utility
In this section we consider the logarithmic utility U(x) = ln(x). The optimal terminal wealth at T is
given by
Xˆ
(1)
T =
x0
L¯T
. (4.30)
The optimal expected utility is
V
(1)
0 = ln(x0)− E
[
ln(L¯T )
]
. (4.31)
The optimal investment process pˆi(1) is given by
pˆi
(1)
t = 1{0≤t<τ∧T}pˆi
(1,b)
t + 1{τ∧T≤t≤T}pˆi
(1,a)
t (4.32)
where
pˆi
(1,b)
t =
µ
σ2
, t ∈ [[0, τ ∧ T [[, (4.33)
pˆi
(1,a)
t =
µ¯It
σ2
, t ∈ [[τ ∧ T, T ]]. (4.34)
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We decompose the optimal wealth process into before and after liquidation parts as
Xˆ
(1)
t = 1{0≤t<τ∧T}Xˆ
(1,b)
t + 1{τ∧T≤t≤T}Xˆ
(1,a)
t (4.35)
where Xˆ
(1,b)
t and Xˆ
(1,a)
t satisfy the following SDEs
dXˆ
(1,b)
t = Xˆ
(1,b)
t pˆi
(1,b)(µdt+ σdWt), t ∈ [[0, τ ∧ T [[, (4.36)
dXˆ
(1,a)
t = Xˆ
(1,a)
t pˆi
(1,a)
t
{
µ¯at dt+ σdW˜t
}
, t ∈ [[τ ∧ T, T ]]. (4.37)
Then we decompose the expected utility of terminal wealth V
(1)
0 into two parts depending on if liqui-
dation occurs before or after time T :
V
(1)
0 = E
[
1{T<τ} ln
(
Xˆ
(1,b)
T
)]
+ E
[
1{T≥τ} ln
(
Xˆ
(1,a)
T
)]
. (4.38)
Comparing (3.40) and (4.33), we know partially informed investors holds the same optimal strategy
as the fully informed investor before liquidation. The optimal terminal wealth for partially and fully
informed investors are identical if no liquidation occurs before T , that is
E
[
1{T<τ} ln
(
Xˆ
(1,b)
T
)]
= E
[
1{T<τ} ln
(
Xˆ
(2,b)
T
)]
.
Thus the first expectation in (4.38) has been calculated in Lemma A.1 and the other expectation is
calculated in Lemma A.3. Combining those lemmas we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4.2. The optimal log expected utility for the fully informed investor is
V
(1)
0 ={
N
(
− lnα
σ
+ (µ
σ
− 12σ)T√
T
)
− exp
(
2µ
σ2
− lnα
)
N
(
lnα
σ
+ (µ
σ
− 12σ)T√
T
)}
×
(
ln(x0) +
1
2
(µ− µ
2
σ2
)T
)
+
∫ 0
lnα
σ
∫ ∞
y
2µx(x− 2y)√
2piT 3
exp
{
(
µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)x− 1
2
(
µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)2T − 1
2T
(2y − x)2
}
dxdy
− lnα
σ
∫ T
0
1√
2pit3
exp
{
− 1
2t
(
lnα
σ
− (µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)t
)2}
h(1)(t)dt
where
h(1)(t) := lnx0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
t− µ
2
2σ2
t+
∫ T
t
(
µ¯Mv
)2
2σ2
dv.
We will consider the optimization problem for the uninformed investors.
5 Uninformed investors
The uninformed investors erroneously believe the market price of the asset follows a Black Scholes
dynamics with constant µ. That is, uninformed investors act as Merton investors. To compare with
the fully informed and partially informed investors, we shall consider both the power utility and
logarithmic utility in the following sections.
18
HILLAIRET et al. Optimal trading under asymmetric information November 7, 2018
5.1 Power Utility
We first consider the power utility, i.e. U(x) = x
p
p
. The uninformed investors adopt the Merton
strategy
pˆi(0) =
µ
(1− p)σ2 . (5.1)
However, the market price process of the asset is given by (2.8). Therefore, corresponding to the
sub-optimal strategy given by (5.1), the wealth process Xˆ
(0)
t is written as
Xˆ
(0)
t = 1{0≤t<τ∧T}Xˆ
(0,b)
t + 1{τ∧T≤t≤T}Xˆ
(0,a)
t
where Xˆbt and Xˆ
(0,a)
t are given by
dXˆ
(0,b)
t = Xˆ
(0,b)
t pˆi
(0) (µdt+ σdWt) , t ∈ [[0, τ ∧ T [[, (5.2)
dXˆ
(0,a)
t = Xˆ
(0,a)
t pˆi
(0)
(
µIt (τ,Θ,K)dt + σdWt
)
, t ∈ [[τ ∧ T, T ]]. (5.3)
We next compute the expected utility of final wealth E[U(Xˆ0T )] using the investment strategy given
by (5.1). We decompose E[U(Xˆ0T )] into two parts depending on whether or not liquidation occurs
before time T
E
[
U
(
Xˆ0T
)]
= E
[
1{τ>T}U
(
Xˆ
(0,b)
T
)]
+ E
[
1{τ≤T}U
(
Xˆ
(0,a)
T
)]
. (5.4)
The two expectations in (5.4) are computed in Lemma A.4 and A.5 respectively.
Proposition 5.1. The expected power utility of an uninformed investor who follows the suboptimal
strategy (5.1) is
E
[
U
(
Xˆ0T
)]
=
xp0
p
exp
(
pµ2T
2(1 − p)σ2
)
×
{
N
(− lnα
σ
+ ( µ(1−p)σ − σ2 )T√
T
)
− exp
(
2µ lnα
(1− p)σ2 − lnα
)
N
(
lnα
σ
+ ( µ(1−p)σ − σ2 )T√
T
)}
− lnα
σ
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ T
0
1√
2pit3
exp
{
− 1
2t
(
lnα
σ
− (µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)t
)2}
l(0)(t, θ, k)ϕ(θ)dtdθdk
where
l(0)(t, θ, k) =
xp0
p
exp
{
µ lnα
(1− p)σ2 +
1
2
µ
(1− p)t−
1
2
µ2
(1− p)2σ2 t+
∫ T
t
(
pµµIv(t, θ, k)
(1− p)σ2
)
dv
}
.
We next consider the same problem for the uniformed investor under logarithmic utility.
5.2 Logarithmic Utility
In case of logarithmic utility, uninformed investors adopt the Merton strategy
pˆi(0) =
µ
σ2
. (5.5)
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We denote by Xˆ
(0)
t the wealth process for uninformed investors as holding the sub-optimal strategy
pˆi
(0)
t given by (5.5). Similar to the case of power utility we calculate the expectation E[U(Xˆ
(0)
T )] using
the decomposition
E[ln(Xˆ
(0)
T )] = E[1{τ>T} ln(Xˆ
(0,b)
T )] + E[1{τ≤T} ln(Xˆ
(0,a)
T )]. (5.6)
Comparing (3.40) and (5.5), we know uninformed investors hold the same optimal strategy as the fully
informed investors before liquidation. The terminal wealth for uninformed and fully informed investors
are identical if no liquidation occurs before T , that is
E
[
1{T<τ} ln
(
Xˆ
(0,b)
T
)]
= E
[
1{T<τ} ln
(
Xˆ
(2,b)
T
)]
.
Thus the first expectation in (5.6) has been calculated in Lemma A.1 and the other expectation is
calculated in Lemma A.6.
Proposition 5.2. The expected log utility of an uniformed investor who follows the suboptimal invest-
ment strategy (5.5) is
E[ln(Xˆ
(0)
T )] ={
N
(
− lnα
σ
+ (µ
σ
− 12σ)T√
T
)
− exp
(
2µ
σ2
− lnα
)
N
(
lnα
σ
+ (µ
σ
− 12σ)T√
T
)}
×
(
ln(x0) +
1
2
(µ− µ
2
σ2
)T
)
+
∫ 0
lnα
σ
∫ ∞
y
2µx(x− 2y)√
2piT 3
exp
{
(
µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)x− 1
2
(
µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)2T − 1
2T
(2y − x)2
}
dxdy
− lnα
σ
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ T
0
1√
2pit3
exp
{
− 1
2t
(
lnα
σ
− (µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)t
)2}
h(0)(t, θ, k)ϕ(θ, k)dtdθdk
where
h(0)(t, θ, k) := lnx0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
t− µ
2
2σ2
t+
∫ T
t
(
2µµIv(t, θ, k)− µ2
2σ2
)
dv
We next present some numerical results.
6 Numerical results
In this section we illustrate numerical results of the optimization problem for the three types of in-
vestors. We set the parameters µ = 0.07, σ = 0.2 and the initial value S0 = 80. We let the investment
horizon T = 1. The liquidation trigger level is chosen as α = 0.9. The stochastic processes are dis-
cretized using an Euler scheme with M = 250 steps and time intervals of length ∆t = 1250 . The number
of simulations is N = 105. We suppose the distribution of (Θ,K) is uniform on [0.05, 0.15]×[0.02, 0.08].
The initial wealth is assumed to be x0 = 80. The power utility function is specified as U(x) = 2x
1
2 .
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6.1 Filtered estimate of the drift
The time horizon [0, 1] is discretized equally as 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tM = 1. For 0 ≤ m ≤M we denote
by µMtm(Θ,K) the discretized approximation of µ
M (Θ,K) at time tm. For 0 ≤ m ≤M − 1, we denote
by ∆Wm the increment of the Brownian motion over the time interval [tm, tm+1]. The approximation
of the increment of the (G(2),Q)-Brownian motion is ∆WQm = ∆Wm +
µMtm (Θ,K)
σ
∆t. We approximate
the filtered drift estimate in (4.23) at time tm by
µˆMtm =
∫∞
0
∫ 1
0
{
µMtm(θ, k) exp
{ ∑
0≤i≤m−1
(
µMti
(θ,k)
σ
(∆Wi +
µMti
(Θ,K)
σ
∆t)−
(
µMti
(θ,k)
)2
2σ2
∆t
)}}
ϕ(θ, k)dθdk
∫∞
0
∫ 1
0
{
exp
{ ∑
0≤i≤m−1
(
µMti
(θ,k)
σ
(∆Wi +
µMti
(Θ,K)
σ
∆t)−
(
µMti
(θ,k)
)2
2σ2
∆t
)}}
ϕ(θ, k)dθdk
.
(6.1)
We use Monte-Carlo method to estimate the integral in (6.1). Suppose the number of simulation is
N . For 1 ≤ n ≤ N , we denote by (θn, kn) the realized value of the random variable (Θ,K) in the nth
simulation. We estimate µˆMtm in (6.1) by the sample mean
µ˜Mtm =
∑
1≤n≤N
{
µMtm(θ
n, kn) exp
{ ∑
0≤i≤m−1
(
µMti
(θn,kn)
σ
(∆Wi +
µMti
(Θ,K)
σ
∆t)−
(
µMti
(θn,kn)
)2
2σ2
∆t
)}}
∑
1≤n≤N
{
exp
{ ∑
0≤m≤m−1
(
µMti
(θn,kn)
σ
(∆Wi +
µMti
(Θ,K)
σ
∆t)−
(
µMti
(θn,kn)
)2
2σ2
∆t
)}} .
(6.2)
In Figure 5 we illustrate a sample filter estimate µ˜M compared with the drift term µM (Θ,K) in a
specific scenario where the realized value of the liquidation random variables are (Θ,K) = (0.1, 0.05).
From Figure 5 we note that the filtered estimate of the drift is very close to the realized drift. This
result suggests that knowing the functional form of the market impact is more relevant than the actual
realization of (Θ,K).
time
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Filter estimate compared with realized drift
filter estimate of the drift
realized drift
Figure 5: Filter estimate of the drift compared with the realized drift
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6.2 Optimal strategy for power utility
In this section we illustrate the optimal strategies for fully and partially informed investors in case of
power utility by solving the related BSDE numerically. We skip the discussion of log utility since the
optimal strategies are simply the "myopic" Merton strategy. In case of fully informed investors, we
approximate the BSDE (3.29) by the following discretized BSDE
H˜tm+1 =H˜tm −
(
p(µMtm(θ˜, k˜))
2
2(1 − p)2σ2 H˜tm +
pµMtm(θ˜, k˜)
(1− p)σ Z˜
H
tm
)
∆t+ Z˜Htm∆Wtm , t0 ≤ tm < tM , (6.3)
H˜tM =1. (6.4)
The BSDE (6.3)-(6.4) can be solved using the following recursive scheme (see Gobet et al. [13])
Z˜Htm =
1
∆t
E[H˜tm+1∆Wtm |G(2)tm ], (6.5)
H˜tm =
E[H˜tm+1 |G(2)tm ] +
pµMtm (θ˜,k˜)
(1−p)σ Z˜
H
tm
∆t
1− p(µ
M
tm
(θ˜,k˜))2
2(1−p)2σ2 ∆t
. (6.6)
We estimate the conditional expectation in (6.5) and (6.6) by the Monte-Carlo regression approach
proposed by Gobet et al. [13]. Note that the market price process SMt is not Markovian with respect
to (G(2),P). We define the running minimum process S˜Mt = inf{SMv |0 ≤ v ≤ t} and note that the pair
(SMt , S˜
M
t ) is Markovian with respect to (G
(2),P). Hence we may choose the regression basis functions:
1, x, x2, y, y2 and xy. By the regression method of Gobet et al. [13] the conditional expectations in
(6.5) and (6.6) can be estimated by
c1 + c2(S
M
t − αS0) + c3(SMt − αS0)2 + c4(S˜Mt − αS0) + c5(S˜Mt − αS0)2 + c6(S˜Mt − αS0)(S˜Mt − αS0)
for some coefficients ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6.
We approximate the optimal strategy for fully informed investor pˆi(2) by p˜i(2,b) as follows
p˜i
(2)
tm
=
µ
(1− p)σ2 +
Z˜Htm
σH˜tm
, 0 ≤ tm ≤ tM . (6.7)
Following a similar procedure we may solve the related BSDE for partially informed investors and
obtain the approximate optimal strategy.
Figure 6 illustrates the approximated optimal strategies for fully and partially investors respectively
corresponding to one sample path of the risky asset price where liquidation occurs well before the
terminal time T . In particular for the path of the asset price in Figure 6 liquidation occurs at time
t = 0.1540. Before liquidation the two strategies are indistinguishable due to the scale. We plot
the optimal strategies before liquidation in Figure 7 and note that there is some tracking error before
liquidation. This difference may be due to the fact that the before liquidation strategy of both investors
contains a component which depends on the solution of a BSDE, which is accomplished backward in
time, and in particular depends recursively on the filtered drift estimate for the partially informed
investor. Hence, owing to tracking error typical to filtering problems some errors may be propogated
to the before liquidation strategy through the numerical solution procedure for the associated BSDE.
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Table 1 presents the approximated optimal strategies for fully and partially investors at times before
liquidation corresponding to Figure 7.
time
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
60
65
70
75
80
85
Asset market price over [0,T]
asset market price
liquidation barrier
time
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
Optimal strategy for fully and partially informed investors over [0,T]
Full informed investor
Partially informed investor
Figure 6: Approximated optimal strategy for fully and partially informed investors over [0, T ]
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time
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
Asset market price before liquidation
time
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Optimal strategy for fully and partially informed investors before liquidation
Fully informed investors
Partially informed investors
Figure 7: Approximated optimal strategy for fully and partially informed investors before liquidation
tm 0.1200 0.1240 0.1280 0.1320 0.1360 0.1400 0.1440 0.1480 0.1520
SMtm 79.0600 79.0766 77.9106 76.2818 74.0479 73.5371 73.4940 73.9593 72.4905
pi
(1)
tm
-0.1127 -0.3614 -0.0063 -0.5712 -0.2756 -0.1780 0.0699 -0.1559 0.1043
pi
(2)
tm
-0.0898 -0.3399 -0.0224 -0.7831 -0.6907 -0.6265 -0.3766 -0.5502 -0.3760
Table 1: Approximated optimal strategies before liquidation
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time
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Asset market price over [0,T]
asset market price
liquidation barrier
time
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Optimal strategy for fully and partially informed investors over [0,T]
Full informed investor
Partially informed investor
Figure 8: Approximated optimal strategy for fully and partially informed investors without liquidation
Figure 8 illustrates the approximated optimal strategies for fully and partially investors respectively
corresponding to a realized path of the asset price that does not induce liquidation. In particular, the
optimal trading strategies of the fully informed and partially informed investors appear almost identical.
We also observe a general tendancy for the optimal strategies to decrease the position in the stock as
its price moves toward the liquidation barrier and increase the position in the stock as the price moves
away from the liquidation barrier. However, as the time to the end of the investment horizon shortens
and the probability of liquidation appears less likely the overall trend to increase the position in the
stock, toward the level of the Merton strategy, dominates.
6.3 Optimal expected utility
In this subsection we implement the Monte-Carlo method to find the optimal expected power and log
utilities. In case of uninformed investors, since the "optimal" strategy is simply the Merton strategy,
we may approximate the wealth process X(0) directly using the Euler scheme. For 0 ≤ m ≤ M
and 1 ≤ n ≤ N , we denote by X(0),ntm the realized wealth for uninformed investors at time tm in
the nth simulation. The expected utility E[U(X(0))] is approximated by the sample mean V¯ (0) =
1
N
∑
1≤n≤N U(X
(0),n
tM
). The standard error of the sample mean is
SE(0) =
√
1
(N − 1)N
∑
1≤n≤N
(
U(X
(0),n
tM
)− V¯ (0)
)2
.
The relative standard error of the sample mean is RSE(0) = (SE(0))/(|V¯ (0)|). The 95% confidence
interval estimate of the sample mean is [V¯ (0)−1.96∗SE(0), V¯ (0)+1.96∗SE(0)]. This simulation scheme
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also applies to the log utility for fully and partially informed investors.
However, in case of the power utility for fully and partially informed investors we cannot approxi-
mate the wealth process directly since the optimal strategies are not explicitly determined. Although
we can first approximate the optimal strategies by solving the related BSDE, this would increase the
size of simulation error. Instead we simulate the likelihood process L in (3.2) and L¯ in (4.16) since the
optimal expected power utilities are functionals of LT and L¯T given by (3.17) and (4.25) respectively.
For instance, in case of power utility for fully informed investors, we denote the discretized realization
of Lt in nth simulation by L
n
tm for 0 ≤ m ≤ M and 1 ≤ n ≤ N . The expectation E[(LT )
p
p−1 ] is
estimated by the sample mean ξ¯ = 1
N
∑
1≤n≤N (L
n
tM
)
p
p−1 . The standard error of the sample mean is
SE(2) =
√
1
(N − 1)N
∑
1≤n≤N
(
(LntM )
p
p−1 − ξ¯
)2
.
The relative standard error of the sample mean is RSE(2) = (SE(2))/(|ξ¯|). The 95% confidence interval
estimate of the sample mean is [ξ¯−1.96∗SE(2) , ξ¯+1.96∗SE(2) ]. By (3.17) the optimal expected utility
for fully informed investors is estimated by V¯ (2) =
x
p
0
p
(ξ¯)1−p. The 95% confidence interval estimate of
optimal expected utility is [
x
p
0
p
(
ξ¯ − 1.96 ∗ SE(2))1−p , xp0
p
(
ξ¯ + 1.96 ∗ SE(2))1−p]. A similar scheme can
be applied to the case of power utility for partially informed investors.
We present the numerical results on the optimal expected utilities for the three types of investors
in the Table 2 and Table 3 for power and log utilities respectively. As should be expected there exists
certain gaps among the optimal expected utilities of different types of investors. We may interpret those
gaps as the value of information asymmetry. The results are more pronounced in the case of power
utility than in the case of power utility. Nevertheless, in both cases there are statistically significant
differences in optimal expected wealth given that the confidence intervals do not overlap. In the power
utility case the optimal strategy of the partially informed investor is very close to that of the fully
informed investor. However, the inability to fully capture the potential gains from trading against
liquidation, owning to the need to estimate the drift and the tracking error, leads to a significantly
lower optimal expected utility.
Expected utilities
Numerical evaluation
Sample mean
Relative 95% estimated
standard error confidence interval
Fully informed 48.9602 0.0883 [44.5223, 53.0279]
Partially informed 31.3099 0.0172 [30.7767, 31.8342]
Uninformed 18.9228 0.0012 [18.8796, 18.9661]
Table 2: Numerical evaluation of optimal power utilities for three types of investors
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Expected utilities
Numerical evaluation
Sample Mean
Relative 95% estimated
standard error confidence interval
Fully informed 4.8282 0.0073 [4.8219, 4.8346]
Partially informed 4.7579 0.0080 [4.7520, 4.7638]
Uninformed 4.3665 0.0005 [4.3621, 4.3709]
Table 3: Numerical evaluation of optimal log utilities for three types of investors
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we characterize the market impact of liquidation by a function of certain form. We con-
sider the portfolio optimization problem for three types of investors with different level of information
about the liquidation trigger mechanism and the market impact. In case of logarithmic utility, we find
the closed-form optimal strategy for all three types of investors. In the case of power utility it is not
as straightforward to find the closed-form optimal strategy for the partially informed investors. Fi-
nally we present some numerical results using Monte-Carlo simulation method. These results indicate
that there is significant value, in terms of optimal expected utility, of increased information about the
opportunity to trade optimally against an investor who may need to liquidate a large position in a
disorderly fashion.
There are several possible directions for improving the model. We can use more realistic models
of market impact or the barrier that may depend on market, regulatory, or macro-economic variables.
For partial insiders, the occupation time below the liquidation threshold is a random variable rather
than a known constant as in case of full insiders. We plan to incorporate permanent price impact into
the liquidation impact function generalizing the temporary price impact function. We shall explore the
effect of different liquidation impact functions on the optimal trading strategies and utility of terminal
wealth of uninformed, partially informed, and completely informed investors. Since certain market
participants possess different market information it is natural to discuss the value of information in
terms of portfolio utility. The results of future research can also inform financial and operational risk
management processes and regulations for certain agents and trading activities including short-selling
prohibitions, buying constraints, or derivatives market participation.
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A Appendix
In the appendix we provide technical lemmas and proofs which allow us to easily justify the main
results.
Lemma A.1.
E[1{τ>T} ln(Xˆ
(2,b)
T )|G(2)0 ] =
(
ln(X0) +
1
2
(µ− µ
2
σ2
)T
)
×
{
N
(
− lnα
σ
+ (µ
σ
− 12σ)T√
T
)
− exp
(
2µ lnα
σ2
− lnα
)
N
(
lnα
σ
+ (µ
σ
− 12σ)T√
T
)}
+
∫ 0
lnα
σ
∫ ∞
y
2µx(x− 2y)
σ
√
2piT 3
exp
{
(
µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)x− 1
2
(
µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)2T − 1
2T
(2y − x)2
}
dxdy
where N (x) = 1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞ e
u2
2 du is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random
variable.
Proof. By (2.1) we have
St = S0 exp
{
σ
(
(
µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)t+Wt
)}
. (A.1)
Define Bt = (
µ
σ
− 12σ)t+Wt and B˜t = inf{Bv |0 ≤ v ≤ t}. Recalling the definition of τ in (2.2) we find
1{τ>T} = 1{B˜T> lnασ }. (A.2)
Let κ = µ
σ
− 12σ. From Jeanblanc et al. [17] we know
P(BT ∈ dx, B˜T ∈ dy) = 1{x>y}1{y<0}
2(x− 2y)√
2piT 3
exp{κx− 1
2
κ2T − 1
2T
(2y − x)2}dxdy. (A.3)
and
P(τ > T ) = N
(
− lnα
σ
+ (µ
σ
− 12σ)T√
T
)
− exp
(
2µ ln(α)
σ2
− ln(α)
)
N
(
lnα
σ
+ (µ
σ
− 12σ)T√
T
)
. (A.4)
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On the other hand, by (3.42) we know
Xˆ
(2,b)
T = X0 exp
{(
pˆi(2,b)µ− 1
2
(pˆi(2,b)σ)2
)
T + pˆi(2,b)σWT
}
= X0 exp
{
µ
σ
(
(
µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)T +WT
)
+
1
2
µ(1− µ
σ2
)T
}
= X0 exp
{
µ
σ
BT +
1
2
µ(1− µ
σ2
)T
}
. (A.5)
Using (A.2) and (A.5) we compute
E
[
1{τ>T} ln
(
Xˆ
(2,b)
T
)
|G(2)0
]
=E
[
1{τ>T}
{
ln(X0) +
µ
σ
BT +
1
2
µ(1− µ
σ2
)T
}
|G(2)0
]
=P(τ > T )
{
ln(X0) +
1
2
(µ − µ
2
σ2
)T
}
+ E
[
1{BˆT> lnασ }
µ
σ
BT
]
(A.6)
since (Θ,K) is independent of F and X0 is G(2)0 -measurable. Finally we apply (A.3) and (A.4) to (A.6)
to obtain the result.
Lemma A.2.
E[1T≥τ ln(Xˆ
(2,a)
T )|G(2)0 ]
=− lnα
σ
∫ T
0
1√
2pit3
exp
{
− 1
2t
(
lnα
σ
− (µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)t
)2}
h(2)(t,Θ,K)dt
where
h(2)(t, θ, k) := lnX0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
t− µ
2
2σ2
t+
∫ T
t
(
µIv(t, θ, k)
)2
2σ2
dv. (A.7)
Proof. Let t = τ in (A.1) we have
Sτ = S0 exp{(µ − 1
2
σ2)τ + σW Pτ }. (A.8)
Using the fact Sτ = αS0 we find
W Pτ =
1
σ
{
lnα− (µ− 1
2
σ2)τ
}
. (A.9)
By (3.42) and (A.9) we compute
Xˆ(2,b)τ = X0 exp
{
(pˆi(2,b) − 1
2
(pˆi(2,b))2σ2)τ + pˆibσWτ
}
= X0 exp
{
µ2
2σ2
t+
µ
σ
Wτ
}
= X0 exp
{
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
τ − µ
2
2σ2
τ
}
. (A.10)
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Solving (3.43) we obtain
Xˆ
(2,a)
T = Xˆ
(2,b)
τ exp{
∫ T
τ
(pˆi2,av (Θ,K)µ
I
v(τ,Θ,K) −
1
2
(pˆi2,av (Θ,K))
2σ2)dv +
∫ T
τ
pˆi2,av (Θ,K)σdWv}
= Xˆ(2,b)τ exp{
∫ T
τ
(µIv(τ,Θ,K))
2
2σ2
dv +
∫ T
τ
µIv(τ,Θ,K)
σ
dWv}. (A.11)
Using (A.10) and (A.11) we compute
E
[
1T≥τ ln
(
Xˆ
(2,a)
T
)
|G(2)0
]
=E
[
1T≥τ
(
ln
(
Xˆ(2,b)τ
)
+
∫ T
τ
(
µIv(τ,Θ,K)
)2
2σ2
dv +
∫ T
τ
µIv(τ,Θ,K)
σ
dWv
)
|G(2)0
]
=E
[
E
[
1T≥τ
(
ln(Xˆ(2,b)τ ) +
∫ T
τ
(
µIv(τ,Θ,K)
)2
2σ2
dv +
∫ T
τ
µIv(τ,Θ,K)
σ
dWv
)∣∣∣∣∣ σ(τ),G(2)0
]
|G(2)0
]
=E
[
1T≥τ
(
lnX0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
τ − µ
2
2σ2
τ +
∫ T
τ
(
µIv(t,Θ,K)
)2
2σ2
dv
)
|G(2)0
]
.
Recall that (Θ,K) is independent to F and that from Jeanblanc et al. [17, Sect. 3.3.1] that the density
of τ is
P(τ ∈ dt) = − lnα
σ
1√
2pit3
exp
{
− 1
2t
(
lnα
σ
− (µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)t
)2}
dt. (A.12)
Using (A.12), and the definition of the function h(2)(t, θ, k) in (A.7), we obtain the result.
Lemma A.3.
E[1T≥τ ln(Xˆ
1,a
T )] = −
lnα
σ
∫ T
0
1√
2pit3
exp
{
− 1
2t
(
lnα
σ
− (µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)t
)2}
h(1)(t)dt (A.13)
where
h(1)(t) := lnx0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
t− µ
2
2σ2
t+
∫ T
t
(
µ¯Mv
)2
2σ2
dv. (A.14)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma A.2, we find the terminal wealth Xˆ
(1,a)
T if liquidation occurs
before T
Xˆ
(1,a)
T = x0 exp
{
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
τ − µ
2
2σ2
τ +
∫ T
τ
(µ¯Mv )
2
2σ2
dv +
∫ T
τ
µ¯Mv
σ
dW˜v
}
. (A.15)
We compute
E
[
1T≥τ ln
(
Xˆ
(1,a)
T
)]
=E
[
1T≥τ
{
lnx0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
τ − µ
2
2σ2
τ +
∫ T
τ
(µ¯Mv )
2
2σ2
dv +
∫ T
τ
µ¯Mv
σ
dW˜v
}]
=E
[
E
[
1T≥τ
{
lnx0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
τ − µ
2
2σ2
τ +
∫ T
τ
(µ¯Mv )
2
2σ2
dv +
∫ T
τ
µ¯Mv
σ
dW˜v
}∣∣∣∣σ(τ)
]]
=E
[
1T≥τ
{
lnx0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
τ − µ
2
2σ2
τ +
∫ T
τ
(µ¯Mv )
2
2σ2
dv
}]
(A.16)
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Using the density of τ given in (A.12) and the definition of the function h(1)(t) in (A.14), we obtain
the result.
Lemma A.4.
1
p
E[1{τ>T}(Xˆ
(0,b)
T )
p] =
xp0
p
exp
(
pµ2T
2(1 − p)σ2
)
×
{
N
(− lnα
σ
+ ( µ(1−p)σ − σ2 )T√
T
)
− exp
(
2µ lnα
(1− p)σ2 − lnα
)
N
(
lnα
σ
+ ( µ(1−p)σ − σ2 )T√
T
)}
. (A.17)
Proof. The proof is basically the same as that of Lemma A.1 except using the power utility function
instead of log utility function. We compute
1
p
E[1{τ>T}(Xˆ
(0,b)
T )
p]
=
xp0
p
exp
(
pµ2T
2(1 − p)σ2
)
×
∫ 0
lnα
σ
∫ ∞
y
2(x− 2y)√
2piT 3
exp
{
(
µ
(1− p)σ −
σ
2
)x− 1
2
(
µ
(1 − p)σ −
σ
2
)2T − 1
2T
(2y − x)2
}
dxdy. (A.18)
Define Ct = (
µ
(1−p)σ − σ2 )t+Wt and C˜t = inf{Cs|0 ≤ s ≤ t}. Note that the integral in (A.18) is equal
to P(C˜T >
lnα
σ
). By Jeanblanc et al. [17, Sect. 3.2.2] we know
P(C˜T >
lnα
σ
)
=N
(− lnα
σ
+ ( µ(1−p)σ − σ2 )T√
T
)
− exp
(
2µ lnα
(1− p)σ2 − lnα
)
N
(
lnα
σ
+ ( µ(1−p)σ − σ2 )T√
T
)
. (A.19)
Substituting (A.19) into (A.18) we obtain the result.
Lemma A.5.
1
p
E[1T≥τ (Xˆ
(0,a)
T )
p]
=− lnα
σ
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ T
0
1√
2pit3
exp
{
− 1
2t
(
lnα
σ
− (µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)t
)2}
l(0)(t, θ, k)ϕ(θ, k)dtdθdk
where
l(0)(t, θ, k) =
xp0
p
exp
{
µ lnα
(1− p)σ2 +
1
2
µ
(1− p)t−
1
2
µ2
(1− p)2σ2 t+
∫ T
t
(
pµµIv(t, θ, k)
(1− p)σ2
)
dv
}
. (A.20)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma A.2 we find the wealth value at liquidation time τ as follows
Xˆ(0,b)τ = x0 exp
{
µ lnα
(1− p)σ2 +
1
2
µ
(1− p)τ −
1
2
µ2
(1− p)2σ2 τ
}
.
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Then the terminal wealth Xˆ
(0,a)
T if liquidation occurs before T is
Xˆ
(0,a)
T = Xˆ
(0,b)
τ exp
{∫ T
τ
(
µµIv(τ,Θ,K)
(1− p)σ2 −
µ2
2(1 − p)2σ2
)
dv +
∫ T
τ
µ
(1− p)σdWv
}
.
We compute
E[1T≥τU(Xˆ
(0,a)
T )]
=
1
p
E
[
1{T≥τ}(Xˆbτ )
p exp
{∫ T
τ
(
pµµIv(τ,Θ,K)
(1− p)σ2 −
pµ2
2(1− p)2σ2
)
dv +
∫ T
τ
pµ
(1− p)σdWv
}]
=
1
p
E
[
E
[
1{T≥τ}(Xˆbτ )
p exp
{∫ T
τ
(
pµµIv(τ,Θ,K)
(1− p)σ2 −
pµ2
2(1 − p)2σ2
)
dv +
∫ T
τ
pµ
(1− p)σdWv
}∣∣∣∣ σ(τ)
]]
=
1
p
E
[
1{T≥τ}(Xˆbτ )
p exp
{∫ T
τ
(
pµµIv(τ,Θ,K)
(1− p)σ2 −
pµ2
2(1− p)σ2
)
dv
}]
Using the density of τ given in (A.12) and the definition of the function l(0)(t, θ, k) in (A.20), we obtain
the result.
Lemma A.6.
E[1T≥τ ln(Xˆ
(0,a)
T )]
=− lnα
σ
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ T
0
1√
2pit3
exp
{
− 1
2t
(
lnα
σ
− (µ
σ
− 1
2
σ)t
)2}
h(0)(t, θ, k)ϕ(θ, k)dtdθdk
where
h(0)(t, θ, k) := lnx0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
t− µ
2
2σ2
t+
∫ T
t
(
2µµIv(t, θ, k)− µ2
2σ2
)
dv. (A.21)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma A.2, we find the terminal wealth Xˆ
(0,a)
T if liquidation occurs
before T
Xˆ
(0,a)
T = x0 exp
{
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
τ − µ
2
2σ2
τ +
∫ T
τ
(
µµIv(τ,Θ,K)
σ2
− µ
2
2σ2
)
dt+
∫ T
τ
µ
σ
dWt
}
. (A.22)
We compute
E
[
1T≥τ ln(Xˆ
(0,a)
T )
]
=E
[
1T≥τ
{
lnx0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
τ − µ
2
2σ2
τ +
∫ T
τ
(
µµIv(τ,Θ,K)
σ2
− µ
2
2σ2
)
dt+
∫ T
τ
µ
σ
dWt
}]
=E
[
E
[
1T≥τ
{
lnx0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
τ − µ
2
2σ2
τ +
∫ T
τ
(
µµIv(τ,Θ,K)
σ2
− µ
2
2σ2
)
dt+
∫ T
τ
µ
σ
dWt
}∣∣∣∣σ(τ)
]]
=E
[
1T≥τ
{
lnx0 +
µ lnα
σ2
+
µ
2
τ − µ
2
2σ2
τ +
∫ T
τ
(
µµIv(τ,Θ,K)
σ2
− µ
2
2σ2
)
dt
}]
Using the density of τ given in (A.12) and the definition of the function h(0)(t, θ) in (A.21), we obtain
the result.
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